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Roger J. Miner 
U.S. Circuit Judge 
St. John's Law Review Alumni Dinner 
Hotel Inter-Continental 
New York city 
Wednesday, March 23, 1994 
7:30 P.M. 
I. 
Jackie and I thank you for your hospitality and your many 
kindnesses throughout the evening. I am happy to have this 
opportunity to address such a distinguished group of men and 
women -- those who have served and those who now serve as members 
and editors of the St. John's Law Review and those who are 
members of the law school faculty. My congratulations and 
sympathies to the new Editorial Board as you embark on your new 
duties. You follow in a great tradition and your responsibility 
is a heavy one. But you have the confidence of your peers, and I 
am sure that you will do an excellent job because you follow in 
the path of excellence. 
I have a special affinity for the St. John's Law Review. As 
Chairman of the Second Circuit History Committee, I worked 
closely with the editors and staff in the production of Volume 
65, No. 3, Summer 1991. That was the symposium issue celebrating 
the centennial of my court, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second circuit. I was tremendously impressed by the 
student editors and staff, by their professionalism, their 
courtesy and their can-do attitudes. The History Committee 
remains grateful to Professor Alexander, a good friend and great 
authority on the federal courts, and to Professor Cavanaugh, who 
provided a great piece on Antitrust in the Second Circuit for the 
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centennial issue .. The faculty advisors to the St. John's Law 
... Review ·are the very best. And so is the Law Review itself. 
According to the 1992 Chicago-Kent survey, it ranks among the top 
journals in the nation, based on the frequency of its citation in 
other journals. 
I am privileged to have a number of friends who are or were 
members of the St. John's Law School faculty -- my colleagues, 
Professors McLaughlin and Pratt; Professor Ed Re, that 
distinguished academic and former judge, with whom I was 
privileged to sit on several occasions; Professor Pierce, spouse 
of my colleague, Larry Pierce; Margaret Bearn, former Assistant 
Dean; as well as Professors Alexander and Cavanaugh. Through 
these and other friends on the faculty as well as through 
professors who have become known to me by their scholarly 
reputations and achievements, I have easily formed the conclusion 
that the st. John's law faculty is as strong as any in the 
nation. Those who study law at St. John's are fortunate indeed. 
The unifying theme of my remarks these evening is language. 
In connection with that theme, I shall touch briefly on the 
language of lawyers in the courtroom, the language of law reviews 
and law review editors and the language of the public trial 
guaranty of the United States Constitution. 
II. 
First, the language of lawyers in the courtroom. In the 
argument of appeals, according to my experience as one 
constrained to listen to appellate arguments, lawyers frequently 
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are unintelligible. How much worse it is for the trial judge, 
who must listen not only to legal arguments but to confused 
factual arguments that lawyers make to juries. By way of 
illustration, I shall quote from an opening statement that I 
found in a trial transcript submitted on an appeal that was 
before me a couple of months ago. In this part of his opening 
statement to the jury, defense counsel attacks the chief 
government witnesses in the following language: 
The evidence will show that Hon Yee-Chau 
is a drug dealer. 
The evidence will show, we can't 
make it disappear, the evidence will show, 
evidence, this man, he ain't got no 
conscience. A drug dealer. He ain't got no 
conscience. A drug dealer. He ain't got no 
conscience. 
The evidence is going to show, after he 
takes that stand, that this drug dealer with no 
conscience, he's a liar. 
The evidence will show, based on 
the cooperation agreement, he had a range of 
punishment from five years to 40 years in 
jail on this planet. 
The evidence will show he is 
going to get some type of departure where he 
may or may not do less than five years. 
The same attorney in the same case, according to the transcript, 
began his summation with the following appeal to the hearts and 
minds of the jurors: 
The awesome majesty that has become the 
American bald eagle, yet, you must 
render unto Caesar only what justly 
belongs to Caesar, and it was the 
intention of our founding father 
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that you use this rendition and you 
temper it with reasonable doubt. 
But the language of lawyers in the courtroom reaches its nadir in 
the imprecise and sometimes incomprehensible questions put to 
witnesses: The responses to such questions often are 
devastating. Take these examples from actual transcripts of 
trial: 
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Q. What happened then? 
A. He told me, he says, "I have to kill you because 
you can identify me." 
Q. Did he kill you? 
A. No. 
Q. Now I am going to show you what has been marked as 
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize 
the picture. 
A. John Fletcher. 
Q. That's you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were present when the picture was taken, 
right? 
Q. Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage 
terminated? 
A. By death. 
Q. And by whose death was it terminated? 
Q. What is your name? 
A. Ernestine McDowell. 
Q. And what is your marital status? 
A. Fair. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. No, I am divorced. 
Q. What did your husband do before you divorced him? 
A. A lot of things that I didn't know about. 
Q. At the time you first saw Dr. McCarthy, had you 
ever seen him prior to that time? 
Q. Mr. Jones, is your appearance this morning pursuant 
to a subpoena which was served upon you? 
A. No. This is how I dress when I go to work. 
Q. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Q. 
A. 
And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral. 
Okay? What school do you go to? 
Oral. 
How old are you? 
Oral. 
Do you have any sort of medical disability? 
Legally blind. 
Does that create substantial problems with your 
eyesight as far as seeing things? 
Are you qualified to give a urine sample? 
Yes, I have been since early childhood. 
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Q. Was there some event, Valerie, that occurred which 
kind of finally made you determined that you had to 
separate from your husband? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he do? 
A. Well, uh, he tried to kill me. 
Q. All right. And then you felt that that was the 
last straw, is that correct? 
Q. As you were driving your car just before the 
accident, where was your right foot located? 
A. It was located at the end of my right leg! 
Q. Doctor, did you say he was shot in the woods? 
A. No, I said he was shot in the lumbar region. 
Q. Do you recall approximately the time that you 
examined the body of Mr. Edgington at the 
mortuary? 
A. It was in the evening. The autopsy started 
about 8:30 P.M. 
Q. And Mr. Edgington was dead at that time, is that 
correct? 
Q. James stood back and shot Tommy Lee? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then Tommy Lee pulled out his gun and shot 
James in the fracas? 
A. No sir, just above it. 
Q. Do you know how far pregnant you are right now? 
A. I will be three months November 8th. 
Q. Apparently then, the date of conception was 
August 8th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you and your husband doing at that time? 
Q. What doctor treated you for the injuries you 
sustained while at work? 
A. Dr. J (name omitted). 
Q. And what kind of physician is Dr. J.? 
A. Well, I'm not sure, but I remember you said he was 
a good plaintiff's doctor. 
Q. Is there somebody in the gang called "Insane"? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Is there a Big Insane? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Is there a Little Insane? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. You don't happen to know their Christian names by 
any chance, do you? 
A. Their Christian names? 
Q. Yeah, like Bill, Charlie, you know Fred? 
A. Perfectly honest, I never knew they was Christian. 
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Q. You claim that you injured your nose in the 
accident? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is that the same nose you broke as a chi,ld? 
Q. Did you say that you were alone in the car at the 
time of the collision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Were you driving? 
Q. Have you ever been arrested? 
A. Not for anything worthwhile. 
Q. What do you do for a living? 
A. I help my brother. 
A. And what does your brother do? 
A. Nothing. 
Q. Isn't it true that you were working off the books 
during the period that you claim that you were 
totally disabled? 
A. Yes, but you can't prove it. 
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VOIR DIRE 
Q. Can you participate in an endeavor in which the 
ultimate result might be death by lethal 
injection? 
A. They do that up in Huntsville, don't they? 
Yeah, I guess I could do it if it was on a weekend. 
Q. Can you tell us that you would follow the court's 
instructions regardless of what else happened 
during the course of the trial? 
A. Cognitively, yes. Rationally, yes. Emotionally, 
effectively, I don't know. Or perhaps effectively, 
yes, and rationally, no. 
QUALIFYING A CHILD 
Q. Do you know what will happen if you tell a lie? 
A. I will go to hell. 
Q. Is that all? 
A. Isn't that enough? 
EXPERT WITNESS 
Q. What is the meaning of sperm being present? 
A. It indicates intercourse. 
Q. Male sperm? 
A. That is the only kind I know. 
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III. 
Let me now turn to the language of law reviews and law 
review editors. I long have held the opinion that law journals 
should be of use to the legal profession. I know that this is a 
radical idea, but I adhere to it nonetheless. In my humble 
opinion, your law journal ranks among those that are the most 
useful to the legal profession. Recent issues have dealt with 
topics that are helpful to lawyers and judges as well as 
academics -- the regulation of hate speech; the bonafide 
occupational qualification exception to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act; hazardous waste liability in bankruptcy 
proceedings; the liability insurer's duty to defend in 
environmental actions; and the survey of New York practice. Your 
symposium issues provide ready reference for the matters with 
which they are concerned -- the two examples that come to mind 
are the centennial issue dealing with the work of the Second 
Circuit, to which I previously referred, and the most current 
issue, which deals in the main with the enforcement of 
international human rights in domestic courts. 
I suggest that much of what is written in law reviews is 
unintelligible and what is not unintelligible is boring and 
repetitious to the point of stupefaction. If I see the word 
"normative" in one more law review article, I shall scream! A 
great many articles are good for tenure applications and not much 
else. The language of the St. John's Law Review generally 
escapes my criticism in this regard. There is one article in a 
recent issue, however, that I have some doubts about. It is 
entitled "Ideology, Due Process and Civil Procedure." I never 
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knew that there was any ideology in how many days you have to 
answer a motion. The article includes the following language: 
"Conservative ideology, with its preference for rule formalism, 
has attempted to formulate civil procedure doctrine, to the 
extent possible, as a system of rigid rules, while liberal 
ideology, with its characteristic skepticism about rules, has 
preferred to construct doctrine utilizing flexible standards." I 
do not think that this statement is true, but even if it is, so 
what? The following language also appears in the article: 
"[N]either liberals nor conservatives have adhered consistently 
to either a broad or a narrow reading of the Due Process Clause, 
but have read it in different ways dependent upon the setting." 
I guess no one can argue with that language, because it says 
nothing. The article just does not pass my usefulness test. It 
is written by a professor, albeit not a St. John's professor and 
illustrates a common failing of the modern law professoriate 
the teaching of law by classifying the work of each member of an 
appellate court rather than by identifying the legal doctrine 
established by the court as a whole. 
I well recall the lead article of the first issue for which 
I was responsible as Managing Editor of my law review. Almost 
forty years have passed since that article first came into my 
hands. It was written by that great lion of American law, Roscoe 
Pound, then Dean Emeritus of Harvard Law School. Entitled "The 
Judicial Process in Action," it came to us in a form all too 
familiar to law review staffers all messed up and with much 
cite and substance work required. Many of the incomplete 
footnotes referred to original French and German sources. "The 
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Judicial Process in Action" -- I have returned to that article 
time and time again during the last forty years -- not because it 
has always remained interesting, informative and timely ~- not 
because it has provided me with valuable insights bearing on my 
work as a judge -- and not because it is a great classic of legal 
literature. I have returned to that article repeatedly over the 
course of four decades because I never have understood the damn 
thing!! Nobody understood Roscoe Pound; that is why he was so 
great. I ask you to note the texture and profundity in the 
language of this aphorism created by the great Pound: "Law must 
be stable and yet it cannot stand still." Is that a useful 
statement or what? 
I also remember the first student note I was responsible for 
editing. The note seems strangely out of date, since it revolved 
around a 1954 ruling of a Cook County, Illinois Superior Court to 
the effect that the fertilization of a woman with the sperm of a 
man other than her husband constituted adultery and that the 
resulting child was illegitimate. The medical technique then was 
known as artificial insemination. The note has stuck in my mind 
all these years because I remember the first line of the piece as 
it was handed in. It read: "Artificial insemination has only 
lately come into the public eye." I immediately saw the need for 
some editing on the first line. 
The language of law review editors stands in a class by 
itself. Editors-in-Chief consider themselves the ultimate 
language mavens. Those who edit my law review articles often 
think, wrongfully, that their language is superior to mine. When 
( editors become law clerks, this wrong-headed thinking is 
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perpetuated. One of my present law clerks is Chris Malloy, a 
former Editor-in-Chief of the st. John's Law Review. I caught 
·· him trying on my robe the other day. He said it was similar to 
the one he wore as Editor-in-Chief but that he also had a crown 
when he served in that capacity. Despite the unbridled egotism 
of Editors-in-Chief, the most important job on the law review is 
Managing Editor, but I may be somewhat prejudiced in this 
opinion. Chris is doing a fine job for me but sometimes, while 
listening to him expound, I am reminded of the biblical story of 
Methuselah. The Bible says that, at the end of his days, 
Methuselah leaned upon his staff and died. 
But it is in their applications for clerkship that the 
language of law review editors and staffers is at its finest. 
This is the language of persuasion. I receive in the 
neighborhood of 250 clerkship applications each year and have 
culled out some actual resumes submitted by members of various 
law reviews throughout the country. Here is persuasive language 
at its very best: 
[Read student resumes] 
The language of the law professoriate is a topic for another 
day, but I do want you to hear a letter of recommendation from 
one professor. 
[Read law professor letter] 
IV. 
Finally, I address the language of a particular 
constitutional provision and bring you my message for the 
evening. The language of the sixth Amendment clearly provides 
the accused with the right to a public trial. Those who wrote 
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the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were well aware of the 
benefits of a public trial, and this aspect of the Sixth 
Amendment provoked little debate when it was proposed. Our 
accepted practice of open courtrooms had its origins in the 
English Common Law. Blackstone wrote the following: 
This open examination of witnesses, viva 
voce, in the presence of all mankind, is much 
more conducive to the clearing up of truth, 
than the private and secret examination taken 
down in writing before an officer, or his 
clerk, in the ecclesiastical courts, and all 
others that have borrowed their practice from 
the civil law: where a witness may 
frequently depose that in private, which he 
will be ashamed to testify in a public and 
solemn tribunal. 
Blackstone also wrote that the requirement for a judge to make 
his rulings in public "must curb any secret bias or partiality 
that might arise in his own breast." 
The American colonies early on provided for public trials. 
For example, the Pennsylvania Frame of Government, written by 
William Penn in 1682, included the guaranty "[t]hat all courts 
shall be open, and justice shall neither be sold, denied nor 
delayed." By the time of the American Revolution, the right to a 
public trial was a generally accepted practice in the colonies. 
Following the ratification of the Sixth Amendment in 1791, most 
of th.e original states as well as those subsequently admitted to 
the union required that all criminal trials be open to the 
public. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held that the Sixth 
Amendment does not confer upon any member of the public or the 
press the right to be present at a criminal trial. This seems to 
fly in the face of history, language, logic and the intention of 
the Framers of the Sixth Amendment. To say that the right to a 
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public trial can only be exercised by the accused is to burden 
the accused with the chore of seeking access to his own trial on 
behalf of others·whoare entitled to access in any event. I do 
not think the Sixth Amendment means to impose this burden. All 
those who seek access should have standing under the Sixth 
Amendment. More historically correct is the New York Judiciary 
Law provision, which does not establish public trial as a right 
of the accused. It provides that, with certain exceptions, 
"[t]he sittings of every court within this state shall be public, 
and every citizen may freely attend the same." 
But not to fear. The Supreme Court has devised a way to 
guarantee public trials, but not under the Sixth Amendment. The 
supreme Court has chosen the First Amendment as the basis for 
access, holding in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia that 
the right to attend criminal trials is "implicit" in the First 
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Why 
one has to find a right implicit in one amendment when it is 
explicit in another is beyond me. But when dealing with the 
supreme Court, you take what you can get. The right of the 
public and the press to have access to criminal trials by virtue 
of the First Amendment was clarified and strengthened in Globe 
Newspaper co. v. Superior Court in 1982. It seems clear at this 
point that the constitutional right of access extends to civil 
trials as well. 
The Supreme Court has taken note of the great importance of 
public trials in fostering the free discussion of governmental 
affairs and in protecting the competence and integrity of the 
judicial process. Openness gives assurance that the proceedings 
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are conducted fairly, it helps to discourage perjury and 
misconduct and it assists in eliminating decisions based on 
secret bias or partisanship. Public trials come"to the attention 
of unknown witnesses, who may then come forward with important 
evidence. A panel of my court has noted "the victim's and the 
community's interest in seeing that offenders are brought to 
account, and the public interest in knowing that fair standards 
are followed . and that variance from established norms will 
come to light." But most of all, as I see it, openness educates 
the public in the operation of our legal system, in the 
importance of the rule of law an.d in the place of the legal 
profession in the protection of the rights of the citizenry. 
And how is this right of access to be realized in this era 
of multi-hour television viewing? By televising trials as well 
as the arguments of appeals, of course. In Chandler v. Florida, 
decided in 1981, the supreme Court gave up a whole line of 
precedent and said that it was okay to have radio, television and 
still photographic coverage in state courts. A number of states 
now have provided for that coverage and we have an experimental 
program now in progress in the federal courts. My court is part 
of the experiment as is the southern District. I can tell you 
that we have no problem with the civil trials and appeals that 
are now being covered. A federal rule presently prevents the 
coverage of criminal trials. I note that New York is in the 
process of a debate over whether to extend its cameras in the 
courtroom experiment. 
Let me give you my "take" on this matter. I think that 
there should be a strong presumption in favor of television 
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cameras in the courtroom in both civil and criminal cases. The 
technology is far advanced, and the cameras are most unobtrusive. 
There is no reason why anyone in tl"!e'' court would be any more 
self-conscious with the camera lens facing him or her than he or 
she is in facing any spectator in the courtroom. I think that 
all trials should be open to television and that all measures 
short of excluding the cameras should be first explored. Cases 
involving sexual assault, children of tender years, trade secrets 
and the like can be dealt with without closing the courtroom 
altogether. But wherever the courtroom is open, there the 
cameras should be allowed. 
As to the charge that the cameras will cover only the 
sensational, I say so be it. I think that the average citizen 
gets a better appreciation for the judicial system and for the 
lawyers and judges who make it work even through the televising 
of sensational cases. Yes, one of the reasons for the bad image 
of lawyers and judges is that nobody understands what we do. I 
think that televising the guilty plea of Tonya Harding 
demonstrated how methodical and careful we are about permitting a 
guilty plea. I think that the trial of Lorena Bobbitt 
demonstrates what juries are confronted with in assessing the 
testimony of witnesses and arriving at the truth. I think that 
the trial of the Menendez brothers showed that lawyers and judges 
and jurors are just hardworking men and women who are doing their 
best to achieve that illusive goal of justice. Of course, these 
are sensational cases, but they illustrate as well as any what it 
is that we do. It is essential that justice is seen to be done, 
and television lets the citizenry see our justice system in 
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action. The court TV network is the best thing that ever 
happened to our profession because it inspires confidence in our 
judicial processes. 
And one more thing while I am worked up about the issue. 
Let's get the cameras into the Supreme Court! Is there any 
possible reason that you can think of not to televise Supreme 
Court arguments? Is there any possibility of prejudice to 
anyone? And wouldn't televising those arguments provide the 
greatest civic lessons the nation could have? There are some 
indications that the Court considers that televised sessions 
would be an affront to its dignity. I think that is ridiculous. 
The image of the Court suffered badly when the Court threatened 
Professor Peter Irons with a lawsuit for releasing the audiotapes 
of oral argument. Now, fortunately, those tapes are available to 
all. What we need, however, is live TV coverage of the Court. A 
single TV camera in that courtroom during oral arguments would be 
completely unnoticed. As Chairman of the Second Circuit Cameras 
in the Courts Committee, I am convinced that we have benefitted 
greatly and that no one has been disadvantaged by televising oral 
arguments in our court. The Supreme Court should also open up to 
TV without delay. Secrecy in government always has raised 
questions in the public mind. Let the sun shine in! 
17 
~---
ST. JOH 'S 
-~-- -
-L --RE IE 
.. [ 
\ -::: 
,- . :SYMPOSIUM 
. CELEBRATING THE CENTENNIAL QF .. ···· · 
THE SECOND CIRCUIT COURTC.:OF __ ~PPEALs· 
(1891~1991) . 1 •. 
"TifE MORE THINGS -CHANGE .- '. •. " ' ' :Ji.Oger,_~· Miner---
-CELEBRA~N~ THE $ECOND c;RCUI1:, CENTm4NI~~ _,fhurg_"qod-Itfar_shiiii' 
THE..CENTENNIAL CELEBRATION OF THE-'8EC0Nn-- CIRCUIT 
- CoURT -oF- APPEALS -- - · 
-____ Crvii· FORFEITURE IN THE SECOND C~~~~- -
-~ - -
-, __ : __ PL~NNING FOR T~-SEOOND CENTURY OY-THE SECOND 
CIRCUIT CouRT OF- APPEAis: THE- REPORT oF THE 
FEDERAL CouRTs---STunv COMMITTEE. -
THE F1RsT AM~ND~ENT- 1N-~THE--SE-CONn C1R~: 
REFLECTIONS ON--Edwards v~ Natioii~L Audubon 
Society, Inc., TliE-PAsT AND THE FuTURE -~-
THE- SECOND C1aCurf~ RoLE ~~ .ExP-AN~~NG T~E 
SEC's.JuRISDICTION ABROAD 
THEY KNo.w IT. wirniN THEY- S~E -IT:·. €uPYRIGHT 
- AND A~sT-HETics ~-l_N THE SECOND Cracu1T 
ANTITRUST_i-N-THE SEC0N1f:G1'Rcu1T ___ -·- , 
So~P,_ CREAM oF' ·Wi-JEM\ -ANtr BAiERIBs:--THE""" 
__ INTELLECTUAL ORmlNs ·oF THE ~' T--· 
Colgate Doc:rRlNE , __ 
-"'°THE SEcoNn_ CrRC~~is E~LOYMENT DrscRiMINATION 
CASES: A'N UNCERTAIN WELCOME 
ONE Hl!NDRED "YEARS OF SoLITUDE: DISSENT IN"THE 
SECOND CmcuiT; 1891-1991 
COLLEAGUES FOR JUSTICE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF THE __ -
UNITED $_".f-ATES:~ CouRT __ OF APPEALS --roR Ttt~ 
SECOND CIRCUIT 
IMP~}ED REPEAL .oF THE SttER¥AN·ActvrATHE-W1tLiAMs 
"---' ACT: Finnegan v~Campe.au -~orp,___~ __ :__- _ _ . . 
' -cRlME-DDESN'T--~AY-=--oR..DoEs IT?: SimoYi;'·& sChuste':', - -
Inc. V.-Fischetti-
\' 
Jiiines L' Oak.es 
_ Gk~rge C'. Pratt 
·· & William If. Peterseq 
_, __,, __ 
~/ 
J.~ - , ,Ro,geN. Mip,er 
Robel-ta S. --_Karmel 
' :::--
_ -. cf:ani_es- H. Carter · 
Edward n Cavan:~gh -
., 
, , ·-Edward P. Krugman' 
Lewis M. Steel 
_ & Mirl.am --F. Clark 
John_ J.-Hoeffner 
. --~ VOLUl\'IE 65 SUl\'IMER =1991 _NUMBER 3 
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW 
VOLUME 67 WINTER 1993 NUMBER 1 
THE REGULATION OF HATE SPEECH BY ACADEME 
vs. THE lnEA OF A UNIVERSITY: 
A CLASSIC OXYMORON? Joseph W. Bellacosa 
THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT AcT: 
WHITHER THE BONA FIDE OCCUPATIONAL 
QUALIFICATION AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
EXEMPTIONS? 
THE LIFE & TIMES OF A CERCLA CLAIM 
IN BANKRUPTCY: AN EXAMINATION OF 
HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILITY IN 
BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 
THE FEAR OF DISEASE AS A COMPENSABLE INJURY: 
AN ANAL YSJS OF CLAIMS BASED ON 
AIDS PHOBIA 
New York City Health and Hospitals 
Corporation v. Perales: UNCLEAR 
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT, PERMISSIBLE 
AGENCY INTERPRETATION 
BITING THE HAND THAT FEEDS You: 
THE REPORTER-CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE 
RELATIONSHIP IN THE WAKE OF 
Cohen v. Cowles 
Mart in Schiff 
THE SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 
1 
13 
55 
77 
105 
125 
145 
Published quarterly by the St. John's Law Review at Fromkes Hall, Grand Central and 
Utopia Parkways, Jamaica, N.Y. 11439. Subscriptions: $24.00 per year; General Issues: 
$9.00; Special Issues: $12.00. Unless notice to the contrary is received at the Editorial Office, 
each subscription will be renewed automatically. Copies of back issues may be ordered 
through William S. Hein & Co., Inc., 1285 Main St., Buffalo, N.Y. 14209. Address all other 
business communications and inquiries to the attention of the Business Manager, St. John's 
Law Review, Fromkes Hall, Grand Central and Utopia Parkways, Jamaica, N.Y. 11439. 
Member, National Conference of Law Reviews. Printed by Darby Printing Co., Atlanta, Ga. 
Second Class postage permit at Jamaica, New York and at additional entry office at Atlanta, 
Georg.ia .OSSN 0036-2905, USPS 354-410). Copyright re 1992 by St. John's Law Review 
.Assoc1at1on. 
( 
ST. JOHN'S L:A'.W REVIEW 
VOLUME 67 SPRING ·1993 
ARTICLES 
IMPROVING ARBITRATION UNDER THE U.S.-ISRAEL 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: A FRAMEWORK FOR A 
NUMBER 2 
MIDDLE-EAST FREE TRADE ZONE Avraham Azrieli 187 
loEOLOGY, DUE PROCESS AND CIVIL 
PROCEDURE - ·--' Kenneth J. Vandevelde 265 
NOTES 
DEATH IS STILL CERTAIN, BUT ARE TAXES?: 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE DUE PROCESS 
LIMITATIONS ON RETROACTIVE TAX 
LEGISLATION AFTE!l Carlton v. United States 
STOPPING STALKERS: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 
OF ANTI-STALKING STATUTES 
TRIGGERING THE LIABILITY INSURER'S DUTY 
TO DEFEND IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROCEEDINGS: 
DoEs POTENTIALLY RESPONSIBLE PARTY 
NOTIFICATION CONSTITUTE A "SUIT"? 
UNWRAPPING FILE WRAPPER EsTOPPEL IN 
THE FEDERAL Crncurr: A NEw EcoNOMIC 
POLICY APPROACH 
THE SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 
327 
347 
383 
405 
425 
Published quarterly by the St. John's Law Review at Fromkes Hall, 8000 Utopia Parkway, 
Jamaica, N.Y. 11439. Subscriptions: $24.00 per year; General Issues: $9.00; Special Issues: 
$12.00. Unless notice to the contrary is received at the Editorial Office, each subscription 
will be renewed automatically. Copies of back issues may be ordered through William S. 
Hein & Co., Inc., 1285 Main St., Buffalo, N.Y. 14209. Address all other business communica-
tions and inquiries to the attention of the Business Manager, St. John's Law Review, 
Fromkes Hall, 8000 Utopia Parkway, Jamaica, N.Y. 11439. Member, National Conference of 
Law Reviews. Printed by Darby Printing Co., Atlanta, Ga. Second Ciass postage permit at 
Jamaica, New York and at additional entry office at Atlanta, Georgia (ISSN 0036-2905, 
USPS 354-410). Copyright e 1992 by St. John's Law Review Association. 
, 
(
-"! 
' 
' ' IJ 
' 
·-', 
J, 
_/-
,\ 
' , 
~ 
-, -· 
-.,.L 
fHE ~bE: i:D,;:Mii n.n.E J:lISTrNaurskn ~c,~-sE:iims' · L _ 
c" SYMPOSIUM ()N Hm!AN,RJGHT$ BEFORE DOti'IBSTIC COURTS , . 
~, - ,lNTRO~u~r~R~~~:- .-· ·,,-.. -~- \ r ~ 0 - -',_ E;dwdrdn_ fi~ ", 
THEi.UNrTEn STATE~ sUP~~-CmtRT "\/ 
'ANn·TIJETuo±EcnON-,OF -~JJaiEs· -----
. . -· - - .. - ' ) -- - -
'c:-'~ 
-( ,, . 
Lµng-ch.u Chen , 
f ' 
·l /' 
THE FlJTURli: OF-THE ALIEN ToaT tiLAiM8 AcT·r-
_, Qi£tJS9: L~sS0Ns.~0M,{N1RE_MAhi::f!S.·1 ·r~ 1 _ \ ' <--
1- \ - - . 
'HuMAN BIGHTS:Ln:ifJATIO.iv < /_., 
-,:._:·____ ·, j' ·:_ .:_ _ _,, ~ . ' - - - - -_ -
REcENT. DEVELOPMENTS- IN' THE UNITED &.i'ATES AND- ' ~ 
INTERNATIONALLY REGARDING CAPITAL 
- , -- I\ -PimisHMENT~ APPRAISAIJ ·• 
' '-' ' ' /. ' ' '' -
· ·-- AFTER ALvAREz-MAcUAin: ABovcT!t>N; / 
· ' STA.NI:lrNd~ I>ENr.Ar.s~OF~JUsTicE', ANn · 
__ -LhNADD~ss~D Hma.~~i Rr~ CLM:Ms 
- . ' '-) ' 
1CONC:t.UDING REMARKS / 
"' < ~ ~- _-
NOTES_ -~- .... ·,-,: ---~ 
;·,· - -~ __ ;,-·-. c - - • • : - ' '-
FOURTH AND GOAL:- PLAYER RESTRAINTS IN PROFESSIONAL~ -
SPoRTs;~ A LoOK BAcK AND A LooK AHEAD 
- - / -~ - ./ < - ~-- - -··. '-~----- .· - ~ 
. FEnERAi.; SENTENCING GuIDEL1NEs:-- RETAINcya 'rtIE 
=-~E~NDERANCE_STAfIDARD:oF ~oOF 
C0MMENT .~ ~ · , 
- __/ ~ - , .. 
AnAPT!NG.Du:E PRdCESS Tf>MA;6H )'.o~ TORT,, ... · .... 
_:fN RE DES:_ A NOVEL Aru>_R~CH ?!?· ,JURISDIGTION f' 
' TliE SURvEY OF NEWYORKPRAcTICE 
.Jrxcn f!tzftatri~ 
.....-~ 
' Ve<J P. Nanda ;f 
'" 
:,, ' 
Jo;da~ ·J.· P'aust 
Eawb:nl D. R~ 
--=-
j_ 
-..I -
VOLUME.67· SUMMER' 1993 , "-NUMBER:3 
• j_ 
Hon . .Roger J. Miner 
Judge Miner was appointed United States Circuit 
Judge for the Second Circuit on July 22, 1985 and entered 
on duty on August 2, 1985. He received a B.S. degree from 
the State University of New York and in 1956 he received 
his LL.B. \cum laude) from New York Law School, where 
he served as Managing Editor of the Law Review. He held 
the rank of Captain, Judge Advocate General's Corps, 
United States Army, and served on active military duty 
from 1956-1959. 
Prior to his appointment, Judge Miner was 
Corporation Counsel for the City of Hudson, New York, 
1961-1964; Assistant District Attorney, Columbia County, 
New York, 1964; District Attorney, Columbia County, 1968-
1975; Justice of the New York Supreme Court, Third 
Judicial District, 1976-1981; and United States District 
Judge for the Northern District of New York, 1981-1985. 
Judge Miner is an Adjunct Professor of Law at New 
York Law School and a member of its Board of Trustees. 
He is a member of the Columbia County, New York State 
and American Bar Associations, the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York, the American Judicature Society, 
the American Law Institute, several historical societies and 
numerous civic and fraternal organizations. He holds 
honorary degrees from Syracuse University (1990) and 
New York Law School (1989). 
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